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1 Introduction
A popular justication of the minimum wage is that it strengthens the hand of the low skilled
workers who are exploited by monopsonist employers. As stressed by Dolado et al. (2000), pro-
ponents of the minimum wage take the competitive working of the labor market as the exception,
rather than the rule, arguing that in many reasonable instances monopsony corresponds to
the rule. Then, the minimum wage seems to be useful because it increases both employment and
the income of low wage workers. This view had a strong inuence on economic policy in the last
fteen years. For instance, in 1994, the OECD Jobs Study was arguing that there was a need to
reassess the role of statutory minimum wages as an instrument to achieve redistributive goals,
and switch to more direct instruments(OECD, 1994). Four years later, after the publication
of a set of papers and a book arguing that minimum wage increases could benet low skilled
employment according to the predictions of the monopsony model of the labor market (Card and
Krueger, 1995), the perspective was quite di¤erent: the OECD Employment Outlook stressed
that a well-designed policy package of economic measures, with an appropriately set minimum
wage in tandem with in-work benets, is likely, on balance, to be benecial in moving towards
an employment-centered social policy(OECD, 1998).
While the recent minimum wage research nds a wide range of estimates on the overall
e¤ects on low-wage employment of an increase in the minimum wage (Neumark and Wascher,
2006), the monopsony model remains inuential. For instance, in year 2005, it is still argued
by the OECD that the main impact of downward wage exibility may be to worsen inactivity,
unemployment and low-pay traps.(OECD, 2005, p 142). As a matter of fact, today, statutory
or quasi-statutory minimum wages are in place in 21 OECD countries (Immervoll, 2007).
An interpretation of the debate is that the practical justication of a minimum wage is
the existence of a large sector of monopsonist employers, while under perfect competition the
scope for a minimum wage would be minimal. The purpose of our study is to address this precise
question: does monopsony on the labor market in itself justify the implementation of a minimum
wage? Our approach is theoretical and considers a situation where the government can use non
linear taxes. Of course, if one does not put any restriction on the shape of taxes, a minimum
wage W can be mimicked by imposing very high taxes on wages below W; so that the minimum
wage would be redundant. To deal with this issue we choose a view point a priori favorable to
the minimum wage: we consider that the minimum wage is a valid instrument whenever it can
replace a non negligible part of the tax schedule. For instance, we consider that the minimum
wage is useful if taxes prevent hirings below a wage threshold. This approach implies that the
minimum wage is useful in the monopsony model with a single skill, a result known since the
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contributions of Robinson (1933) and Stigler (1946). Indeed, when there is a single skill, the
government can reach the competitive equilibrium with the minimum wage without using taxes.
However, when the heterogeneity of skills is accounted for, the minimum wage cannot play
this role any more. The government always needs taxes to correct the ine¢ ciencies associated
with the monopsony. Strikingly, in that case, we nd that there is no scope for the minimum
wage. This result is not limited to the pure monopsony model. It also applies to monopsonistic
competition with free entry.
The papers which look at the minimum wage in labor markets with imperfect competition
typically ask whether increasing the minimum wage can improve employment or welfare in the
absence of other policy tools.1 The e¢ ciency of the minimum wage when there are taxes has
mostly been considered in labor markets with perfect competition.2 Most models have adopted
the standard Mirrlees (1971) model on optimal taxation with labor supply at the intensive margin
where individuals choose the number of hours they work and where the government observes
earnings but neither hourly wages nor hours of work. It turns out that the minimum wage can be
welfare improving when tax schemes are constrained or when there are specic assumptions made
to allow the government to observe skills at the bottom of the income distribution (Allen, 1984,
Guesnerie and Roberts, 1987, Boadway and Cu¤, 2001). However, as stressed by Guesnerie
and Roberts (1987) and more recently by Lee and Saez (2007), informational inconsistencies
arise when a minimum wage is introduced in the Mirrlees model because the minimum wage
implementation requires observing hourly wages. But if hourly wages were directly observable,
then the government could achieve any rst best allocation by conditioning taxes and transfers
on hourly wage and the minimum wage would obviously not be useful.
This informational inconsistency leads us to focus on labor supply at the extensive mar-
gin where the agentsdecision is zero-one, to work or not to work, as in the studies of Dia-
mond (1980), Beaudry and Blackorby (1997), Saez (2002), Choné and Laroque (2005, 2008)
and Laroque (2005). Lee and Saez (2007) have studied the consequence of the minimum wage
in this type of model assuming perfect competition on the labor market. They derive precise
conditions on the shape of the rationing scheme on the labor market under which a minimum
wage can be a useful complement to taxes in a competitive environment. In particular, they
nd that the minimum wage is useful under the assumption that workers who involuntary lose
their job because of the minimum wage are those with the highest opportunity cost of work.
In our paper, we analyze the scope for minimum wages when labor markets are monopson-
1See, among others Robinson (1933), Stigler (1946), Drazen (1986), Jones (1987), Manning, (1995, 2003),
Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), Bhaskar and To (1999), Masters (1999), Cahuc et al. (2001), Flinn (2006).
2The recent paper of Hungerbühler and Lehmann (2007), where the usefulness of the minimum wage is analyzed
in a search and matching model, is an exception.
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istic. We consider the standard optimum tax environment of model of optimal taxation with
labor supply at the extensive margin. There is a large population of workers who have het-
erogeneous productivities and opportunity costs of work which are independently distributed
in the population. The government is all powerful but is limited by his lack of information on
the characteristics of the private agents. Given its preferences for redistribution, it chooses the
optimal tax scheme implementing the second best allocation.
We rst present the model with heterogeneous skills and heterogeneous opportunity costs of
work (section 2). Then, we give the denition of the usefulness of the minimum wage that we
apply to the model (section 3). We recall that this denition implies that the minimum wage
is useful in the textbook model of the monopsony, which corresponds to the case of a single
skill (section 4). The rest of the paper shows that the minimum wage is not useful any more
when there are a continuum of skills. To obtain this result, we study the optimal tax scheme
when the labor market is monopsonistic instead of perfectly competitive. Section 5 describes
the optimal tax schemes when the labor market is perfectly competitive. Section 6 denes
second best allocations with monopsonistic labor markets. Technically, the contribution of the
paper is to adapt the standard principal agent setup where the principal is the government
and the agents are the tax payers to a situation where there is a third party, the monopsonist,
who sets wages. Compared with the laissez-faire, apart from the allocative distortions (wage
and employment are lower than under perfect competition), the monopsonistprots create a
specic redistributive issue which we analyze in two stages. First, in section 7, we suppose that
the government has the information and power to fully tax prots. We prove that there is a
labor tax schedule that implements the second best allocation of the competitive model. Taxing
prots and giving employment subsidies yield the optimal allocation. This allows us to show
that there is no room for minimum wage. Second, in section 8, we introduce a simple model
of monopsonistic competition with free entry to investigate what happens when the taxation of
prots is limited by information constraints. We consider an economy with a large number of
identical islands, which only di¤er by i.i.d. entry costs. The government implements corporate
subsidies (or taxes) on top of the labor tax schedule. Strikingly, the previous result still holds:
the tax tools are enough to undo the wrongs of the monopsonist and get the same allocations
as in a competitive economy. Accordingly, in our framework, monopsonistic competition does
not justify the introduction of a minimum wage. Finally, section 9 provides some concluding
comments.
3
2 The model
We consider an economy made of a continuum of agents of measure 1. A typical agent is described
by a couple of exogenous characteristics, denoted by  = (!; ). The rst component ! denotes
her productivity when working full time in market activities, producing an undi¤erentiated
desirable commodity. The second component, , is a xed cost of participating in the labor
market, also measured in commodity units. In the economy there are prot maximizing rms
that allow the transformation of the agentslabor into commodity, and a benevolent government
with a redistributive social aim, who can raise taxes or distribute subsidies and set a minimum
wage. The general structure of the economy and the distribution of agentscharacteristics are
common knowledge.
The labor market works as follows. The government cannot observe the individual charac-
teristics: it only sees whether an agent works or not, and in the former case, the wage paid
by her employer. An employer observes the productivities ys of his employees, but not their
opportunity costs of work. When she works, the type-(!; ) agent produces a quantity y, at
most equal to ! (the opportunity cost of work  is xed : it does not depend on the di¤erence
(!   y)). When working and producing y, an employee gets a net wage W (y), possibly subject
to a minimum wage constraint W (y)  W . The tax schedule, denoted by T (W ) (if negative,
the absolute value of T is a subsidy to work), yields a labor cost C(W ) =W + T (W ).
Production may generate prots. We assume that after tax prots, if any, are dissipated
by the owners of the rms with no contribution to social welfare. Under full information, we
consider both the normal case where prots are taxed away in a lump sum fashion and the
situation where they are not taxed at all. In section 8 we introduce an information based model
of prot taxation.
The tax receipts are then used to give a subsistence income r to the unemployed agents.
We assume that ! and  are independently distributed. The cumulative distributions of 
and ! are denoted F () and G(!) respectively. F has support [; ] while G has support [!; !].
We suppose
0   <   1 and 0  ! < !  1:
F and G have continuous derivatives, denoted by f and g respectively, which are strictly positive
everywhere on their support. A part of the analysis carries through with an unrestricted distrib-
ution for the couple (; !), involving mass points and correlation between the two characteristics:
we shall point out specically when the independence assumption is needed.
The agents have a simple choice criterion, linear in income. They decide to produce an
output y rather than stay on the dole whenever their nancial incentive to work, W (y)   r; is
4
larger than their work opportunity cost . Their choice follows from:3
u(W; r;; !) = max
0y!
[r;W (y)  ]: (1)
Let y(!) be the production of an agent of productivity ! who works. The proportion of agents
of productivity ! that are employed is F [W (y(!))  r].
The preferences of the government are represented by a social welfare functionZ Z
	(u(W; r;; !))dF () dG(!);
where 	 is a non decreasing concave function.
To be feasible, the quadruple (W;T; r; y) must satisfy the budget constraint of the govern-
ment. When the prots of the rms are not taxed, the budget constraint takes the formZ !
!
T fW (y(!))gF [W (y(!))  r]dG(!) = r
Z !
!
f[1  F [W (y(!))  r]g dG(!): (2)
The left hand side represents the collected taxes, while the right hand side measures the unem-
ployment benets. When the rms prots are taxed away, the government collects taxes T and
prots y   T  W on each job, so that the budget constraint becomes:Z !
!
fy(!) W (y(!))gF [W (y(!))  r]dG(!) = r
Z !
!
f[1  F [W (y(!))  r]g dG(!): (3)
The sequence of decisions is such that the government announces its policy, the tax function,
the subsistence income and possibly the minimum wage at the beginning of the period, while
anticipating the budget constraint. Then the rms choose the net wage function which relates
productivity to net wage. Finally the workers decide on their labor supply.
3 On taxation and the minimum wage
Through the tax function T; the tax on prots and the subsistence income r, the government
has powerful policy tools at his disposal. Is a minimum wage useful in this circumstance? To
address this issue we take the most favorable stance toward the minimum wage: we admit that
the minimum wage is useful whenever it can replace a non negligible part of the tax schedule.
Let us dene the usefulness of a policy instrument when the government has multiple, pos-
sibly redundant, instruments at its disposal. Here, the set of instruments is made of open wage
intervals [Wn;Wn+1) with non zero associated tax functions, Tn(W ), and a positive minimum
wage W:When an instrument is not used, laissez-faire is the benchmark: T (W ) = 0 on the rel-
evant interval or W = 0, keeping the subsistence income r unchanged. We dene an instrument
3 In case of indi¤erence between several maxima, we suppose that the worker chooses the largest production.
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as useful if: rst, it enters a combination of instruments that supports the optimal allocation;
second, among all such combinations, there exists at least one from which the instrument cannot
be dropped out without reducing welfare. Consider a situation where the optimum allocation
is supported by two instruments: a tax function equal to innity on [0;W ), and another non
zero function T (W ) above W . Suppose that both instruments are useful: the allocation is not
implemented with a zero tax on [0;W ): This allocation is also supported by a minimum wage
W and the function T (W ) above W . Dropping the minimum wage, as the innite tax before,
would be welfare reducing. Thus, the minimum wage is useful.4
This denition has the following implication:
Proposition 1 Consider an allocation where W0 is the lower bound of the wage distribution
supported by taxes. Then the minimum wage is useful if and only if laissez-faire over the interval
[0;W0) does not support the optimum.
Proof : Consider an allocation where W0 is the lower bound of the wage distribution supported
by taxes T (W ). A minimum wage can be substituted for the tax T (W ) over the interval [0;W0):
The question is whether it is useful. There are two cases to consider.
First, suppose that laissez-faire does not support the optimum over the interval [0;W0). This
means that either T (W ) > 0 or the minimum wage prevent individuals from working over some
parts of [0;W0): Thus, the minimum wage is useful.
Second, suppose that the minimum wage is useful over the interval [0;W0). This means that
setting the minimum wage to zero and T (W ) = 0 over [0;W0) induces individuals to work at
wages below W0: Thus, laissez-faire does not support the optimum over the interval [0;W0):
QED.
This proposition implies that the minimum wage is not useful when the lowest value of
productivity of employed workers, !inf ; is equal to the sum of the subsistence income, r; and the
lowest work opportunity cost, : In this case, under laissez-faire over the interval [0;W0), the
potential wage of persons of productivity smaller than !inf is below r+, the minimum income
required to participate in the labor market.
With this denition we recall in the next section that the minimum wage is useful to correct
the ine¢ ciencies associated with the monopsony when there is a single skill. However, the
denition also implies that there is no need for a minimum wage when skills are heterogeneous.
4From an institutional viewpoint, it may make sense to separate the enforcement of the tax scheme at the
bottom of the income distribution, when it presents features of a minimum wage, from the general accounting rules
associated with a tax schedule. For instance, in the US, the minimum wage can be enforced through monetary,
civil or criminal penalties. Employers who willfully or repeatedly violate the minimum wage requirements are
subject to a civil money penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation. Such considerations are absent from our
theoretical model.
6
4 The case with a single skill
It is worth briey recalling the justication of the minimum wage in the textbook model of
monopsony introduced by Robinson (1933). All workers are homogeneous with respect to pro-
ductivity: there is a single productivity level !: Moreover, taxes and transfers on labor are
usually not considered, so that we can set r and T equal to zero for now.
The monopsonist is assumed to face a labor supply curve that relates the wage, W; to the
level of employment, equal to F (W ). The monopsonist maximizes his prot, knowing the shape
of the supply curve, i.e. the quantity
 = (!  W )F (W ):
This leads to the rst order condition5
! =W +
F (W )
F 0(W )
. (4)
The left-hand side of this equation is the marginal productivity of labor and the right-hand
side is the marginal cost of hiring an extra worker. The marginal cost is higher than the
wage W because the employer computes the overall e¤ect of the increase on his wage bill,
knowing the labor supply schedule: the derivative of the wage bill WF (W ) with respect to W
is WF 0(W ) + F (W ), implying a cost per worker of W + F (W )=F 0(W ) (there are F 0(W ) extra
workers). The solution is represented graphically on Figure 1, where the marginal cost of labor
(MCL) is represented as a function of the employment level. The equilibrium employment level
is at the intersection of (MCL) with the horizontal line of intercept !. The wage chosen by the
monopsonist, denoted by WM ; is read on the labor supply curve: it is lower than the marginal
productivity !: Both wage and employment are lower than under perfect competition. The
employer is making positive prots on workers who are all paid below their productivity.
As Robinson (1933, p 295) argued, monopsonistic exploitation of this type can be removed
by the imposition of a minimum wage. It su¢ ces to set a minimum wage up to the compet-
itive wage ! to force the monopsonist to the competitive level of employment, equal to F (!):
Notice that the minimum wage eats away the prots of the monopsonist. A government who
does not care about redistribution (whose preferences are represented by a linear function 	)
would systematically choose this minimum wage level in order to maximize production. But the
government can also use taxes to implement this optimum. The prot of the rm, when wages
are taxed (the typical net wage W bears a tax t), is
(!   t W )F (W ):
5When the function F is log concave, an assumption which is often made, the logarithm of prot is concave
so that there is a single maximum characterized by the rst order condition.
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MCL
Labor supply = F(W)
Employment
Wage
WM
F(WM)
w
F(w)
Figure 1: The textbook model of monopsony
Prot maximization yields the same rst order condition as (4) where !  t is substituted for !.
Accordingly, the employer is induced to choose the competitive wageW = ! and the competitive
employment level if t =  F (!)=F 0(!); i.e. the tax is a subsidy. Assume that prots can be
taxed away in a lump sum way: this allows the government to nance the subsidies. Therefore,
a complete system of taxes is equivalent to the minimum wage in this model. This is reminiscent
of the subsidy proposed by A. Robinson, (Robinson, 1933, p. 163), to lead a monopolist to
produce the competitive output.
To summarize, the textbook model of monopsony shows that e¢ ciency can be reached either
with the minimum wage or with taxes on prots whose proceeds are used to nance employment
subsidies. In this setup, the minimum wage is useful according to our denition. Moreover, it
seems easier to use the minimum wage, rather than levying taxes on prots and redistributing
the proceeds of these taxes under the form of employment subsidies. In what follows, we show
that the minimum wage does not perform so well when there is a diversity of skills.
5 Second best tax schemes with perfectly competitive labor
markets
Before studying imperfect competition, it is useful to recall the properties of optimal taxation
and of the second best allocations in a perfectly competitive economy with heterogeneous skills.
A second best optimum is a triple (W; r; y), such that
1. the workers choose whether to work or not, and the amount they produce y(!), taking as
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given (W; r), according to
max
0y!
[r;W (y)  ]; (5)
2. anticipating the behavior of the agents, the government chooses a tax schedule (W; r)
which maximizes the social welfare function:Z !
!
(Z W [y(!)] r

	 [W (y(!))  ]dF () + f1  F [W (y(!))  r]g	(r)
)
dG(!); (6)
subject to the budget constraint:6Z !
!
fy(!) W [y(!)] + rgF [W (y(!))  r]dG(!) = r: (7)
The optima, as dened by 1. and 2., are studied in some details in Choné and Laroque
(2008). Following the denition, second best optima are found as follows. First (5) implies
that without loss of generality one can restrict the attention to non decreasing functions W and
that workers work at their full productivity. Second, one solves the optimization problem of the
government, maximizing (6) with respect to (W; r) subject to the constraint (7) on the set of non
decreasing functions W . The tax wedge is then merely the di¤erence between the productivity
! and the net wage W (!):
At the optimum the wage function is uniquely dened on an interval [!inf ; !] of productivities,
for which there are working agents. It can be given any arbitrary value, at most equal to r + 
for smaller productivities. We can also show that the lowest productivity among the employees,
denoted by !inf , is at most equal to :7 Accordingly, !inf is lower than r +  and following
proposition 1, the minimum wage is of no use at the competitive equilibrium in our setup.
This would not be necessarily the case when the elasticity of labor demand is nite as in the
contribution of Lee and Saez (2007).
6 Second best tax schemes with monopsonistic labor markets
We consider now the case where the government faces a large rm, which is the sole buyer on
the labor market. We dene second best allocations. Formally, a second best optimum is a
6Under perfect competition, prots are equal to zero, so that (2) coincides with (3).
7Let us write the Lagrangian of the program of the government for productivity ! :Z W r

	(W   )dF () + [1  F (W   r)]	(r) +  [(!  W + r)F (W   r)  r]
where  stands for the marginal cost of public funds. Suppose that W (!) = r +  for ! 2 (; !inf ]: On this
interval, the derivative of the Lagrangian would be
(!  W + r)f(W   r) = (!   )f() > 0:
Therefore, a small increase in W would increase the value of the Lagrangian. Thus !inf   at the optimum.
9
quadruple (W;T; r; y), such that
1. the workers choose whether to work or not, and the amount they produce y(!), taking as
given (W; r), according to
max
0y!
[r;W (y)  ]; (8)
2. the monopsonist chooses the net wage, taking as given (T; r), and anticipating the reactions
of the workers to its choice, by maximizing
max
Z !
!
[y(!) W (y(!))  T (W (y(!)))]F [W (y(!))  r]dG(!); (9)
3. the government chooses (T; r), anticipating the behavior of the monopsonist and of the
workers, maximizing the social welfare function:Z !
!
(Z W (y(!)) r

	(W (y(!))  )dF () + f1  F [W (y(!))  r]g	(r)
)
dG(!); (10)
subject to the feasibility constraintZ !
!
fy(!) W (y(!)) + rgF (W (y(!))  r) dG(!) = r; (11)
when prots are taxed, orZ !
!
fT (W (y(!))) + rgF (W (y(!))  r) dG(!) = r; (12)
when they are not. We assume that the government chooses a continuous and bounded
below tax function T:
In order to simplify the resolution of this problem, it is useful to show that one can restrict
the analysis to net wages that increase with productivity.
Lemma 1 At a second best optimum, without loss of generality:
1. the monopsonist can choose a net wage function W that is non decreasing with respect to
productivity ;
2. the government can choose a tax schedule T such that the function x ! x + T (x) is
everywhere non decreasing;
3. all the employees work at their full productivity !:
10
Proof : see appendix.
This lemma shows that any second best allocation can be reached with non decreasing
net wage and cost schedules. At a second best optimum individuals work at their full time
productivity and the net wage is a non decreasing function of productivity in the competitive
environment. These properties also hold when the labor market is dominated by a monopsonist.
7 Monopsony with full taxation of prots
We consider a monopsony whose prots can be fully taxed by the governement. We prove that
the government can bypass the monopsonist and implement the second best allocation of the
competitive economy. Then we present two simple examples that illustrate the shapes of the
tax schedules.
7.1 The optimal tax schedule
The description of the programs of the government (compare 2. in the denition of second
best optima in section 5 with 3. in the denition of second best optima in section 6) makes
it clear that, when prots can be fully taxed, the only di¤erence between the competitive and
monopsony problems comes from the (possible) restrictions imposed by the behavior of the
monopsonist (9). As a consequence, the second best optima of the monopsonistic economy
cannot Pareto dominate those of the competitive economy. They can at best coincide with them
if the government manages to undo the wrongs caused by the monopsonist. We are going to
show that this is indeed the case.
The Lagrangian of the program of the government in a competitive economy is
L =
Z !
!
(Z W (!) r

	(W (!)  ))dF () + 	(r)f1  F [W (!)  r]g
+  f[!  W (!) + r]F [W (!)  r]  rg
)
dG(!); (13)
to be maximized over (W (:); ; r), for non decreasing Ws. Let [!inf ; !] be the endogenous
set of productivities for which there are a positive number of employees at the optimum. The
Lagrangian can be rewritten equivalently as
L

=  r + 	(r)

+ (14)Z !
!inf
(
!  W (!) + r +
Z W (!) r

	(W (!)  ) 	(r)
F [W (!)  r] dF ()
)
F [W (!)  r]dG(!):
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Now, the objectives of the government (14) and of the monopsonist (9) are aligned provided
that to any value W; W > r + ; of the net wage corresponds a value C(W ) = W + T (W ) of
the labor cost such that
C(W ) =W   r  
Z W r

	(W   ) 	(r)
F [W   r] dF (): (15)
Note that C can take any value when wages are smaller than r+ since nobody works for such
wages. Therefore
Theorem 1 The second best optimal allocations in a monopsonistic economy where the prots
can be fully taxed are identical to that of a competitive economy. An optimum in the monopson-
istic economy can be implemented through a tax wedge T (W ) which satises
T (W ) =  rc   1
c
Z W rc

	(W   )
F [W   rc] dF () 	(r
c)

for W  rc + ;
where rc and c are respectively the optimal subsistence income and marginal cost of public funds
of the competitive economy.
Theorem 1 states that all allocations that can be reached in a competitive economy can
also be reached, with di¤erent tax schedules, when the labor market is monopsonistic. It is a
striking result which means that the government can systematically undo the wrongs caused by
the monopsonist at no cost. Actually, this is already the case in the textbook example, discussed
above, where the government can use either employment subsidies nanced by taxes on prots
or a minimum wage to reach the desired allocation. However, when skills are heterogeneous,
the minimum wage is not useful any more. Indeed, since the allocation is the same as in the
competitive economy, the lowest productivity of the employees is smaller than the lowest bound
of the opportunity costs of work, . This implies that nobody with productivity below !inf
would want to work under laissez-faire, i.e. when T (W ) = 0 for all wages below rc + : Then,
Proposition 1 entails that the minimum wage is not useful.
Also it is easily checked that the tax function T is negative for W  rc + . Employment
subsidies are e¢ cient because they counteract the natural inclination of the monopsonist to
reduce its demand for labor8.
It should be stressed that the proof of Theorem 1 relies on the independence of the distribu-
tions of productivities and work opportunity costs. Indeed, in case of dependence, the argument
8Note that the function C(W ); dened in (15), can have decreasing parts. The construction of Lemma 1
allows us to dene an equivalent non decreasing cost function C(W ) = minxW C(x). It is easy to see that the
associated tax schedule, T; is also negative, as the original function T , for all W > rc + :
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does not go through: the number of workers, that is equal to F (W (!)   r) in equation (14),
becomes a function F (W (!)   rj!) that depends on !: Then, the expression of the cost that
aligns the objective of the government and the monopsonist, dened in equation (15), has no
economic meaning since it depends on the unobserved !.
It would be of interest to know whether Theorem 1 extends to situations where productivity
is correlated with work opportunity cost. We do not have a general answer to this question.
However, there is an extreme polar case which is easily dealt with: this is the situation where
the work opportunity cost is a continuous increasing function of productivity, say a(!). It can
be shown that the rst best optimum consists in putting to work all individuals of productivity
! greater than or equal to a(!), while distributing welfare equally with a utility level equal to
r for everyone where
r =
Z
!a(!)
[!   a(!)]G(!):
The government can implement this optimum in a monopsonistic economy, when the monopsony
prots are taxed away. Let C(W ) =W r (compare with (15)). Then the monopsonist pays the
workers at the lowest acceptable net wage, W (!) = a(!) + r, and employs all individuals who
bring a non negative prot, i.e. such that !   C(W (!)) = !   a(!)  0, the same individuals
as in the rst best optimum.9
Let us now look more precisely at the shape of the second best tax schedules in the monop-
sonistic model.
7.2 The shape of optimal tax schedules: two examples
The tax policy is not the same in the competitive and the monopsonistic case. The properties of
the tax schedule in these two cases can be illustrated by looking at two polar assumptions about
the objective of the government: rst an output maximizing government, whose preferences
are represented by the social welfare function 	(x) = x; then a Rawlsian government which
maximizes the welfare of the most disadvantaged agents.
Output maximizing government
When the labor market is competitive, the equilibrium without tax and subsistence income,
rc = T (W ) = 0, yields a rst best allocation. It is easy to check, from (13), that the marginal
cost of public funds c is equal to 1. An agent with characteristics (!; ) gets a utility level
9 In the case where labor supply is innitely elastic one might think that minimum wages are justied because
monopsonistic employers take subsidies in their pocket instead of giving wage increases. Actually, in that case,
the monopsonist always sets the net wage at the reservation level a(!) + r, whatever the labor tax or subsidy.
Employment subsidies serve to implement the optimal level of employment, and the minimum wage is not needed.
Indeed the objectives of the monopsonist and of the government are aligned when the elasticity of labor supply
is innite as far as the determination of the net wage is concerned.
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wW(w) = w
C(W(w)) = w /2
T(W(w)) = - w /2
Figure 2: The net wage schedule W (!), the tax schedule T (W (!)); the labor cost schedule
C(W (!)) when there is an output maximizing government in a monopsonistic economy with
uniform distribution functions.
max (0; !   ). When the labor market is monopsonistic, the equilibrium without taxes does
not yield a rst best allocation any more. The previous section has shown that the rst best
allocation can nevertheless be implemented. The tax system which supports it can be found
by rewriting the Lagrangian of the government program as
R !
! [!   C(W (!))]F (W (!))dG(!);
with C(W ) = W   RW W F (W )dF (). The tax, equal to the di¤erence between labor cost C(W )
and net wage W , is negative, equal to   RW (W   )dF ()=F (W ).
The solution is represented on Figure 2 in the case where F and G are uniform over [0; ]
and [0; !] respectively. Then, measured as a function of net wage, the subsidy is equal to W=2,
so that the labor cost associated with a net wage W is also W=2 and the monopsony eventually
chooses the net wage schedule W (!) = !:
Rawlsian government
A Rawlsian government maximizes the value of the subsistence income provided to the
unemployed agents. Noting I(!) =W (!) r the incentive to work, the program of the Rawlsian
government can be written as
max
I()
r =
Z !
!
f!   I(!)gF [I(!)]dG(!): (16)
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wW(w) = r+(w / 2)
C(W(w)) = w /2
T(W(w)) = - r
w
r
0
Figure 3: The net wage schedule W (!), the tax schedule T (W (!)); the labor cost schedule
C(W (!)) when there is a Rawlsian government in a monopsonistic economy with uniform dis-
tribution functions.
The comparison of this program with the program of the monopsonist (9) immediately shows
that the objectives of the Rawlsian government and the monopsonist are aligned if the labor
cost schedule C() is equal to the incentive to work W   r: As shown in gure 3, when F and
G are uniform over [0; ] and [0; !] respectively, the resulting allocation provides net wages
W (!) = r + (!=2) and a subsistence income r = !=8.
8 Entry and limits on corporate taxes
We have so far assumed that prots are entirely taxed away, as is consistent with the fact that
the government knows the prot level. To put limits to the power of the government to tax rms
while keeping with the spirit of optimal taxation models à la Mirrlees, we introduce additional
information asymmetries which allow the rms to keep some rents. A simple and illustrative way
to proceed is to consider a situation where the government regulates a continuum of separate
local labor markets. In all these labor markets, there is the same distribution of workers as the
one of the previous section: these markets work independently and there is no labor mobility
across markets. Firms have to pay an entry cost10 h; which is drawn independently across
labor markets with the c.d.f. H. The government, which observes net wages as before but not
10A positive value of h corresponds to an entry cost; a negative value can be interpreted as a rent of size jhj.
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the entry costs of the rms, announces the same tax schedule (T; r) over the whole territory,
with additionally a lump sum subsidy s ( s is the level of the tax when s is negative) given
to the rms to help them pay their costs. Given our informational assumption, the subsidy
can only be constant, identical across labor markets. The economy works as follows: rst the
government announces the full tax and subsidy schedule common to all markets; second the
random entry costs and productivity are drawn; the rms decide to operate when the sum of
their expected prots and subsidy exceeds the entry cost; nally production is undertaken and
wages are paid in the markets which operate; in the other markets, nobody works and everyone
gets the subsistence income r.
When labor markets are competitive operating prots are equal to zero under constant
returns to scale and rms decide to operate when s   h is non negative. The government
program then is
max
[T ();r;s]
H(s)
Z !
!
(Z W (!) r

	(W (!)  ) dF () + f1  F [W (!))  r]g	(r)
)
dG(!)
+ [1 H(s)]	(r);
subject to the feasibility constraint
H(s)
Z !
!
f!  W (!) + rgF (W (!)  r) dG(!) = r + sH(s):
Let  be the multiplier of the feasibility constraint, and for further reference denote (T c; rc; sc; c)
a solution of the above program for the competitive economy.
When the labor markets are monopsonistic, the rmsoperating prots allow them to nance
some of the entry costs and the subsidy may be negative. The before tax operating prot  of
the typical rm is
 =
Z !
!
f!  W (!)  T (W (!))gF (W (!)  r) dG(!);
under (T; r). The rm decides to operate when  + s  h is non negative, i.e. with probability
H( + s).
The program of the government becomes
max
[T ();r;s]
H( + s)
Z !
!
(Z W (!) r

	(W (!)  ) dF () + f1  F [W (!))  r]g	(r)
)
dG(!)
+ [1 H( + s)]	(r);
subject to the feasibility constraint
H( + s)
Z !
!
f!  W (!) + rgF (W (!)  r) dG(!) = r + ( + s)H( + s);
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while the monopsonist sets a wage schedule according to
W () = argmax
S()
Z !
!
f!   S(!)  T (S(!))gF (S(!)  r) dG(!):
Although the prot ; which depends on T; shows up in the objective and the feasibility
constraint of the government, this does not create di¢ culties since it only appears through the
after tax prot  + s: Indeed put  + s = sc in the program of the government: ignoring the
behavior of the monopsony the solution of the program is then a competitive optimum (the
government manages to tax away all monopsony prots!). This allows us to transpose here the
argument of Theorem 1. The objective of the government and of the monopsonist are aligned
and yield the competitive net wage W c if one denes
Tm(W ) =  rc  
Z W (!) rc

	(W   ) 	(rc)
cF [W   r] dF ():
The prot of the monopsonistic rm follows, and the value of sm is computed from sm = sc m.
This implies that the government can reach the same allocation as in the competitive economy.
It is worth noting that the function Tm has the same analytical expression as in Theorem 1,
but di¤erent values of the marginal costs of public funds and the subsistence income. Therefore,
as discussed in section 7, the government does not need the minimum wage to undo the wrongs
of the monopsony even when prots cannot be fully taxed. With the instruments adapted to
its information structure, the government has all the necessary scal tools to reach the second
best optimum of the competitive economy without using the minimum wage. It could be worth
analyzing the degree of generality of this result.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we compare income redistribution in two economies which only di¤er by the
functioning of their labor markets, competitive or monopsonistic. The government has a large
range of instruments at its disposal, which includes wages and prots taxes and the minimum
wage. By dening the minimum wage as useful whenever it can replace a non negligible part
of the tax schedule, we take the view point the most favorable to the minimum wage. Even
with this view point, the minimum wage appears to be of no use to correct the transfers or
ine¢ ciencies associated with the monopsony when the heterogeneity of skills is accounted for.
This result holds when abilities are distributed independently of work opportunity costs. It
is also satised when work opportunity cost is a deterministic increasing function of ability. We
do not know how to handle the intermediate cases.
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The conclusion that monopsony does not justify the minimum wage does not mean that the
minimum wage is useless as a part of e¢ cient redistributive schemes in all circumstances (indeed
see Lee and Saez (2007) for a counter example). What we claim here is that in the absence of
restrictions on the set of available tax instruments, a monopsony on the labor market can be
dealt with without using a minimum wage in a linear technology setup. Whether the minimum
wage somehow can be useful in other circumstances is an open question. More research is needed
in this area.
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A Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
1) This is a consequence of the behavior of workers. When confronted with a net wage schedule W ,
workerschoice of y follows from:
sup
0y!
[r;W (y)  ]:
Let
W (y) = supfW (z)j0  z  yg:
By construction W is non decreasing, the utility levels attained by the agents under W and W are
identical, while the labor supply under W is a subset of the labor supply under W . Therefore, the
monopsonist can choose a non decreasing net wage schedule without loss of generality.
2) This follows from a study of the behavior of the monopsonist. Consider any bounded below function
C, and let
C(w) = inf
xw
C(x):
Dene C = fwjC(w) < C(w)g, or equivalently fwj there exists z > w such that C(z) < C(w)g. This set
is empty if C is non decreasing, and C coincides with C outside of C.
We show that a monopsonist facing the tax schedule leading to C will never employ a worker at a
net wage in C, so that C and C lead to the same allocation.
Let W be a net wage schedule. The monopsony prots areZ !
0

y(!)  C(W (y(!)))F  W (y(!))  r dG(!);
where y(!) is the production of a worker of productivity ! who faces the net wage schedule W .
Property: Assume that C is a continuous bounded below function on IR+. There is an optimal non
decreasing net wage schedule W such that
W (IR+) \ C = ;:
Proof of the property: Take a W associated with C, which is non decreasing by 1), whose range
may have a non empty intersection with C. We modify it into a new function W whose range does not
intersect C, while weakly increasing the prots of the monopsonist.
By continuity of C, the set C is made of the union of disjoint intervals, say (w0; w1). One of the two
following situations arises:
a) either C(z) > C(w1) for all z smaller than w1;
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b) or there exists w0 such that C(w0) = C(w1), and C(z) > C(w1) for all z such that w0 > z > w1.
We treat the two cases in turn, supposing that there is some z in the interval and some y such that
z =W (y).
a) In the rst case, let
y1 = inffyjW (y)  w1g:
We modify W for all y  y1 through dene:
W (y)  + r for y < C(w1)
W (y) = w1 for C(w1) < y < y1:
By construction the new W is non decreasing. It leads to prots at least as large as the original W :
if there are points such that y < C(w1); the pointwise prot initially equal to [y  C(W (y))]F (W (y)); is
negative, but becomes null because nobody works when W (y)  + r; when there are points such that
C(w1) < y < y1; the pointwise prot is initially positive, but is at least as large after the transformation
since C(w1)  C(W (y)) and F (w1)  F (W (y)). The range of the modied W has an empty intersection
with [0; w1) as desired.
b) In the second case, let
y0 = supfyjW (y)  w0g;
and
y1 = inffyjW (y)  w1g:
We modify W on the interval (y0; y1) through
W (y) =

w0 for y0 < y < C(w1)
w1 for C(w1) < y < y1:
By construction, the new W is non decreasing. It leads to prot sat least as large as the original
W : for the ys such that y0 < y < C(w1), if any, this follows from the fact that the pointwise prot
[y C(W (y))]F (W (y) r) is negative, associated with the inequalities C(W (y)) > C(w0) and F (w0 r) 
F (W (y)   r); similarly for the ys such that C(w1) < y < y1, the pointwise prot is positive and
F (w1   r)  F (W (y)  r). The range of the modied W has an empty intersection with (w0; w1).
This completes the proof of the Property.
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